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Cultivating Farmworker Injustice: The Resurgence
of Sharecropping
JENNIFER T. MANION*
Certain industries in the United States have always relied upon inexpensive,
undemanding, and plentiful immigrant workforces. This reliance on outside
labor is most notable in the agricultural industry. Indeed, from the southern
plantations fueled by slave labor to the strawberry fields on the West Coast
tended by Japanese farmers, much of the agricultural work in this country has
been performed by newly--and involuntarily-arrived populations who lack the
freedom or ability to seek other means of support. With immigration from other
countries, Mexico in particular, on the rise, it is no surprise that many Hispanic
immigrants are finding work in the agricultural industry. What is surprising is
that despite the enactment of laws geared toward protecting these workers, they
are finding themselves little better off than their predecessors. The dijffculties
that immigrant farmworkers continue to face are due in part to employers'
efforts to evade the requirements of protective legislation by labeling their
farmworkers as independent contractors in sharecropping contracts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lured by the possibility of achieving the independence that they had sought,
the Ramirez family of Salinas, California, entered a contract with a local
vegetable broker, Veg-a-Mix, that seemed to offer the family a chance to finally
"own[ ] [their] own farm and earn[ ] a living from it."' Under the contract, the
Ramirez family received a loan from Veg-a-Mix to grow zucchini and in return
promised to sell their crops exclusively through the broker.2 After working under
these contracts for several years, however, the Ramirez family has nothing to
show for their hard work except a debt to Veg-a-Mix for approximately $65,000.3
* This note is dedicated with love to my parents, David and Treacy Manion.
'The story of the Ramirez family and their experiences working under a sharecropping
contract was featured in a report by Chris Amold, Hispanic Farmers Getting Trapped in
Business Deals Similar to the Days of Sharecropping (NPR Morning Edition radio broadcast,
Aug. 17,2000), available at www.npr.org/ramfiles/me/20000817.me.ram.
21d. The loans the family receives each year amount to tens of thousands of dollars and are
used for planting and fertilizing costs.
3 Id. According to Javier Ramirez, whose father entered the Veg-a-Mix contract, the broker
informed them that the money from the zucchini they had grown was applied towards their
loan. Javier's father, who speaks only Spanish, is the only family member who has seen the
contract, which is written entirely in English. Despite working for the broker for several years,
the family has not been able to pay off its debts or receive any profits from their work. Instead,
the family depends on the money that Javier's mother earns packing broccoli for another
agricultural company. Id.
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The arrangement that the Ramirez family entered with Veg-a-Mix has
apparently become quite common among Hispanic farmworkers in California,
4
but "language barriers and a lack of experience with the business side of farming"
have resulted in many farmers losing rather than making money in the deals.5
With farmers winding up in debt to their brokers and thus remaining obligated to
continue working under contracts that are unlikely to become profitable, there
appears to be a resurgence of sharecropping in the California agricultural
industry.6
Thought by many to be a practice of the post-Civil War past, where former
plantation owners devised sharecropping arrangements in order to keep former
slaves in perpetual servitude-and poverty--sharecropping has emerged as an
employment system in the contemporary agricultural industry.8 While
sharecropping arrangements have resulted in success for some,9 the arrangements
41d. According to Mike Meuter, an attorney who directs the Salinas branch of California
Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA), a non-profit legal organization, some agricultural companies
"actively recruit' farmers for these contracts, "tak[ing] them out to dinner and offer[ing] to help
them start their own family farm." Id. Updated information about the work CRLA does on
behalf of farmworkers is available at the organization's website, www.crla.org. 1d51d. Arnold's story also featured Salvador Serrano, who entered into a strawberry contract
that resembled the Ramirezes'. After Serrano incurred debts to his broker instead of profits, the
California Department of Agriculture investigated and found that the broker "had swindled
Salvador Serrano over ten years and... owed him more than a hundred thousand dollars." Id
Although the broker disappeared before Serrano could collect the money it owed him,
Serrano's alleged debt to the broker was cancelled. Id.6Id ("[Mjany Hispanic farmers are getting trapped in business deals reminiscent of the
days of sharecropping.").
7 Michael Parrish, Betting on Hard Labor and a Plot of Land, LA. TIMES, July 7, 1995, at
Al.
8 Amold, supra note 1. The words "sharecropping" and "sharefarming" are used
interchangeably to refer to the situation described in this note. See Jeanne M. Glader, Note, A
Harvest of Shame: The Imposition of Independent Contractor Status on Migrant Farmworkers
and Its Ramifications for Migrant Children, 42 HAsTINGs L.J. 1455, 1455 n.2 (1991). This note
will use the terms "sharecropping" and "sharecroppers.'
9See Parrish, supra note 7. Parrish's story featured Hipolito Meza, a welder and machinist
who had spent five years on a waiting list with GSB, a California agricultural company, before
entering a sharecropping agreement for strawberries, a crop which is commonly the subject of
sharecropping contracts. In his first year as a sharecropper, Meza's earnings exceeded his prior
annual income of $60,000. Parrish also cites examples of sharecroppers who have paid their
children's college tuitions and traveled in Europe with their earnings. Unlike others who enter
sharecropping contracts, Meza was well-informed about the risks involved, having "read a lot
about old-time sharecropping." Id. Meza most likely also benefited from the experience of his
father-in-law, who was a sharecropper for eighteen years with a well-known agricultural
employer, Driscoll Strawberry Associates, Inc. Id. Driscoll Strawberry Associates was one of
the defendants in a Fair Labor Standards Act challenge to sharecropping contracts, Real v.




also provide numerous opportunities for abuse, as is frequently the case when the
sharecroppers are immigrants who are unfamiliar with the contractual terms, their
legal rights, and the English language.'0
This note examines the use of sharecropping arrangements with immigrant
farmworkers and the problems and abuses that arise from such arrangements. Part
I examines the history and development of sharecropping in American
agriculture and offers some reasons for sharecropping's current popularity. Part
III discusses current sharecropping arrangements that immigrant farmworkers
have entered and the difficulty of complying with the contract's terms. Part IV
discusses the legislative response to recognized abuses of farmworkers, the
application of protective legislation by courts, and the overall ineffectiveness of
current means of protecting sharecroppers.' Part V suggests reasons why
legislative and judicial remedies thus far have not been effective. Part VI proposes
legal as well as social changes to assist this group of farmworkers.
I1. THE HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND CURRENT POPULARITY OF
SHARECROPPING
A sharecropping contract divides responsibilities for raising an agricultural
product between the supplier of labor and the supplier of capital. 12 In a traditional
sharecropping arrangement, a farmworker agrees with a landowner to use his
land, to run the farm independently, and to pay the owner with a percentage of the
crops.13 A landowner or agricultural business may also supply seed or equipment
to a farmer who works to raise the crop with the understanding that the two
parties will share the profits of the harvest.'
4
'OSee Glader, supra note 8, at 1458; see also Arnold, supra note 1.
" See Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872
(1994). The Act has been referred to as "MSPA," "MSAWPA," and "AWPA" in case law and
law review articles. This note will refer to the statute as AWPA in keeping with the Supreme
Court's use of the acronym in Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990), the only
Supreme Court case dealing with AWPA to date. See Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925,
928 n.3 (11 th Cir. 1996).
12See Parrish, supra note 7; Arnold, supra note 1.
13 Glader, supra note 8, at 1466.
14Parrish, supra note 7. This agreement to share the profits of a harvest is based on the
premise that there will be profits. Owners in sharecropping deals have been able to avoid
paying farmworkers by structuring transactions so that a worker's share of the profits is first
applied to pay off the owner's initial loans of seed, equipment, or start-up money. The worker's
entire share of the profits may be used to pay these debts. Frequently, the debt to the owner
exceeds the farmworker's portion of the profits, so the worker is compelled to enter another
contract with the owner. Thus, sharecropping arrangements create a cycle in which
farmworkers continue to work hoping to make a profit, but instead frequently incur additional
debt. Id; see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (discussing sharecroppers Ramirez and
Serrano).
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Historically, sharecropping arrangements between landowners and
farmworkers deliberately kept workers in debt and under a continuing obligation
to landowners.' Although current use of sharecropping contracts by agricultural
businesses has been criticized,16 proponents of sharecropping claim that "between
honest business partners," contracts established upon "a fair distribution of profit
and risk" benefit farmworkers as well as the large businesses with which they
deal.' 7
A. Post-Civil War Sharecropping
Sharecropping arrangements--and their potential unfairness to
farmworkers-can be traced back to the post-Civil War South,' 8 when plantation
owners hired former slaves to work as "tenant farmers."'19 By overcharging the
farmworkers for the land they rented as well as other supplies that had been
advanced to the farmers as part of the initial deal, landowners were able to ensure
that the workers' debts exceeded their portion of the profits from the harvest.20 In
debt to the landowners, the farmworkers were bound to continue working under
the same unfavorable terms with little chance of ever paying off their debts or
becoming independent farmers.2
Sharecropping also was popular in Califomia during the first half of the
Twentieth Century.22 Japanese American farmers who had been incarcerated
during World War I[ entered into sharecropping deals in order to re-establish
themselves as farmers or to earn enough money to pursue other business
15 Arnold, supra note 1.
16 See id. (concluding that "everyone agrees that some dishonest companies are preying
upon unsophisticated immigrants").
17 Parrish, supra note 7.
8 Jay R. Mandle, Sharecropping and the Plantation Economy in the United States South,
in SHARECROPPING AND SHARECROPPERS 120-29 (T.J. Byres ed., 1983) (analyzing the rise of
sharecropping as a substitute for the plantation labor system); see also Parrish, supra note 7.
'9 Arnold, supra note 1.
2 Parrish, supra note 7.21id.
22 See Miriam J. Wells, Legal Conflict and Class Structure: The Independent Contractor-
Employee Controversy in California Agriculture, 21 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 49, 63 (1987)
[hereinafter Wells, Legal Conflict] (stating that the "precedent" for sharecropping strawberries
in California was established "by Japanese farmers who could not own land until the Alien
Land Laws were repealed in 1954"); see also MIRIAM J. WELLS, STRAWBERRY FIELDs 110-12
(1993) [hereinafter WELLS, STRAWBERRY FIELDS].
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opportunities. 23 Despite the potential for abuse, many of these farmworkerssucceeded in making a profit from sharecropping.24
B. Current Uses of Sharecropping Contracts
Sharecropping has reemerged in the agricultural industry in the form of
labeling immigrant farmworkers as "independent contractors" instead of as
employees.25 A worker's classification as an independent contractor or employee
is significant because the classification determines which legal protections apply
to the worker.2 6 By labeling farmworkers in sharecropping contracts "as
independent contractors, agricultural employers are able to avoid the expense and
inconvenience of complying with worker protection provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), including health and safety standards, unemployment and
disability insurance, and... protections against oppressive child labor.
27
Farmworkers who are classified as independent contractors are likewise
precluded from the protections available under the National Labor Relations
Act.2
8
Despite criticism of classifying workers in sharecropping agreements as
independent contractors, 29 agricultural employers have succeeded in defending
23See WELLS, STRAWBERRY FIELDS, supra note 22, at 113 (many Japanese Americans
returned to sharecropping after being released from internment camps "to get their bearings and
earn some money"); see also Panish, supra note 7.24 Parrish, supra note 7. According to Tomio Tsuda, a former sharecropper interviewed in
Parrish's article, sharecropping was "a fair deal" and "a good way of getting started" for many
Japanese Americans who returned from internment camps or military service after World War
II to find they had "lost everything." Id. Tsuda was able to purchase a car repair shop after
working for three years as a strawberry sharecropper. Id.2SSee Glader, supra note 8, at 1455. An independent contractor is defined as "a person
who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor
subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of
the undertaking." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958). The Restatement also lists
ten "matters of fact" which, along with other factors, may be used to determine "whether one
acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor." Id § 220; see infra notes 65-72
and accompanying text.26See Glader, supra note 8, at 1456; see also Arnold, supra note 1 (noting that "by setting
up these immigrants as independent farmers, the [agricultural] companies avoid legal
responsibility").
27 Glader, supra note 8, at 1456 (footnote omitted).21See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994) ('The term 'employee'... shall not include ... any
individual having the status of an independent contractor...."). The NLRA's definition of
"employee" likewise excludes "any individual employed as a agricultural laborer." Id.29 See Marc Linder, Employees, Not-So-Independent Contractors, and the Case of Migrant
Farmworkers: A Challenge to the "Law and Economics" Agency Doctrine, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 435, 436 (1986-87) [hereinafter Linder, Employees] (arguing that agricultural
workers should not be considered independent contractors because they are more dependent
economically on their employers than any other group of workers).
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this system by asserting either that farmworkers are independent contractors or
the employees of independent crewleaders."
Sharecropping contracts utilizing the independent contractor label are used by
agricultural businesses throughout the country,31 but they are predominately used
in California by producers of labor-intensive crops, such as strawberries. The
contracts seem to appeal to Hispanic farmworkers, many of whom have worked
as migrant farmers.33 Like the former slaves in the South and the Japanese
Americans in California before them, Hispanic farmworkers view sharecropping
as a step toward independence and a way to advance economically.
34
Unfortunately, modem sharecroppers often find themselves in the same economic
predicaments as their predecessors.35 Sharecropping arrangements present a way
for agricultural businesses to avoid responsibility under labor laws for
sharecroppers who actually are employees despite their independent
classification.36 In fact, the agricultural businesses entering these contracts are
very much in control of the work their supposedly independent contractors do.37
The development of sharecropping in the United States indicates that it is
groups who are precariously situated socially, financially, and legally who are
3 0 See Jeanne E. Varner, Note, Picking Produce and Employees: Recent Developments in
Farmworker Injustice, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 433, 440 (1996). Varner's analysis of the independent
contractor-employee debate focuses on Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434 (1 1th Cir.
1994). In Aimable, the Eleventh Circuit applied the joint-employer doctrine to determine that
Long & Scott was not liable to the migrant and seasonal workers who brought suit for unpaid
wages. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 436-37, 445; see also Varner at 452-60. The Aimable court
concluded that a crew leader, who was himself an independent contractor hired by Long &
Scott, was the plaintiffs' true employer. Id. at 435.31 See MARC LINDER, MIGRANT WORKERS AND MINIMUM WAGES 217 (1992) [hereinafter
LINDER, MIGRA.NT WORKERS] ("[S]harecropping [has], at various times, been imposed on
migrants harvesting pickles in Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Carolina,
Texas, [and] Colorado, ... cherries in Michigan [and] onions in Ohio.").32 Wells, Legal Conflict, supra note 22, at 50. Wells' analysis of sharecropping focuses on
the California strawberry industry. Until the mid-1960s, most strawberry producers in
California hired "wage laborers" to work on their farms. 1d. By the mid-1970s, however, a
significant percentage of strawberry farms in the state were using sharecroppers instead. Id.
Wells explains that strawberry plants are particularly fragile and require constant maintenance
throughout the growing season, so "workers must exert care, some skill, and judgment." Id. at
54; see also Parrish, supra note 7 (reporting that in Califomia in 1995, approximately "40% of
the strawberries [were] grown and harvested by sharecroppers").33See Glader, supra note 8, at 1458. See generally Parrish, supra note 7; Arnold, supra
note 1.34 See Parrish, supra note 7.
35 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.36 Glader, supra note 8, at 1467.
17See Linder, Employees, supra note 29, at 437; see also Arnold, supra note I
(commenting that "often the broker company is essentially an employer in control of the
farmer" and that companies "tell the farmers what to grow, how to grow it, and when to pick
it").
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drawn into sharecropping deals: African Americans after the Civil War, Japanese
Americans who were precluded from owning land, and, currently, Hispanic
immigrants during an era of much anti-immigration sentiment." By looking at the
prevalence of sharecropping among these groups, a pattern emerges in which
members at the lower socio-economic level in agricultural communities become
the victims of unfair sharecropping deals 9 While some Hispanic farmers have
succeeded through sharecropping,40 those success stories usually involve farmers
who are proficient in English and who have some business experience.41 Groups
with few to no legal rights who are also the targets of racial or ethnic prejudice
suffer the most adverse consequences as sharecroppers.42
111. CURRENT SHARECROPPING CONTRACTS
The structure of a sharecropping arrangement is generally set by a contract
that states the "status, rights, and obligations of each party."43 A sharecropping
agreement generally classifies a worker as an independent contractor.44 Because
farmworkers who are labeled "as 'independent contractors' do not fall within the
FLSA definition of 'employee,' growers are not required to provide such workers
3 See Wells, Legal Conflict, supra note 22, at 63 (discussing Japanese sharecroppers);
Glader, supra note 8, at 1458 (discussing Hispanic sharecroppers); Harry Valetk, Note, "I
Cannot Eat Air!": An Economic Analysis of International Immigration Law for the 21st
Century, 7 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 141, 144-45 (1999) (discussing recent anti-
immigrant sentiments); Parrish, supra note 7 (discussing African American sharecroppers);
Arnold, supra note 1 (discussing African American and Hispanic sharecroppers).39See EDWARD ROYcE, THE ORIGINS OF SOUTHERN SHARECROPPING 75 (1993) (After the
Civil War, "[p]lanters used labor contracts to reassert the multifaceted authority they had
possessed under slavery."); see also WELLS, STRAWBERRY FIELDS, supra note 22, at 110-12;
Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project,
and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407,414 (1995) (noting "the
legitimization of anti-immigrant and racist sentiment in the current political climate").40See supra note 9 (describing Hipolita Meza, who earned over $60,000 during his first
year as a sharecropper); see also supra note 24 (discussing Tomio Tsuda, a Japanese American
who worked as a sharecropper after losing his property during World War IT).41 See supra note 9. Meza had lived in the United States for most of his life, spoke English
fluently, and had worked as a machinist and welder before becoming a sharecropper. Meza's
prior work experience and research of the potential risks involved in sharecropping undoubtedly
assisted him in finding a fair contract to enter. Recent immigrants with minimal language
abilities, who do not have alternative jobs upon which to rely until they find fair sharecropping
contracts, are more likely to be taken advantage of by dishonest agricultural companies. See
also supra note 24. Tsuda, like Meza, had lived in the United States and spoke English when he
worked as a sharecropper. Although Tsuda was starting over and apparently had to contend
with the anti-Japanese sentiments that were prevalent at the time, his prior experience in the
United States most likely helped him to avoid losing money under his sharecropping contract.42 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
43 Wells, Legal Conflict, supra note 22, at 65.
44 Glader, supra note 8, at 1455-56.
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with any of the protections the Act affords.""5 In a typical agreement, the
landowner agrees to "furnish and prepare the land; plant the crop; cultivate, spray,
and fertilize the crop; and pay all the costs incurred with respect thereto. ' 6 The
sharecropper in the agreement promises to "furnish the labor necessary to care for
the land and plants during the growing season, to harvest the... crop, and to sort,
grade and pack the [crop] for marketing by [the grower]. 47 After selling the crop,
the sharecropper and landowner share the proceeds.
48
A. The Questionable Independence of Sharecroppers
Although the sharecropping agreement is structured to give the farmworker a
level of independence beyond that of an employee, the validity of the independent
contractor classification is questionable.49 In addition to the accuracy of applying
the term "independent contractor" to an immigrant farmworker, the unequal
balance of power between the parties makes these agreements suspect.50 Rather
than freely choosing to enter these agreements, "[w]orkers often sign these
independent contractor agreements only because they are forced to as a condition
of employment."'" Farmworkers have "little control over the care and
management of the... operation" in the majority of sharecropping contracts.52
The unequal power of the contracting parties is obvious from the terms of
many of these contracts. In many agreements, "[t]he farmer has to pay interest on
the loan[;] ... pay the broker for refrigeration when the produce is delivered[;
and] ... often even has to buy the cardboard boxes to put the fruit in exclusively




461d. at 1455.471d. at 1455-56 (alteration in original).481Id. at 1456.49Id. at 1483 (stating that there is "no valid socio-economic or legal reason ... for
classifying cotton-hoers as self-employed business people") (quoting Linder, Employees, supra
note 29, at 438 n.15).50See id. at 1466-67 ("Characteriz[ing] the migrant worker as an independent business
person contracting freely with the grower is an extremely inaccurate portrayal of the true
balance of power in the working relationship").
5 1Id. at 1467; see also Steve Etka, Contract Agriculture: Serfdom in Our Time, at
http://wvw.sustainableagriculture.netsustnews.htnl (last visited Sept. 7, 2001) (discussing
"contract agriculture" and stating that often "growers discover how vulnerable they have
become to the take-it-or-leave-it terms of the contracts"),.52 Glader, supra note 8, at 1466.53Amold, supra note 1.541d.
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Language barriers also pose significant problems when farmworkers enter
sharecropping contracts.:5 Spanish-speaking farmworkers who sign contracts
written in English may not understand the obligations they are assuming, and not
all agricultural companies attempt to explain the terms of the agreements. 6
Because many farmworkers "don't understand the contract[,] [they] can be taken
advantage of.""
B. Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Associates and Donovan v. Brandel:
Courts 'Inconsistent Application of the Independent Contractor Analysis
Challenges to contracts that classify immigrant farmworkers as independent
contractors have had varying success. In Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Associates
(DSA),58 Mexican American farmworkers sued a large California strawberry
grower.59 The Ninth Circuit examined the nature of the working relationship
between the farmworkers and the strawberry grower in addition to the contractual
language and found evidence sufficient to "undercut[ ] the [grower's] assertion
that the [farmworkers were] independent contractors." 0
The contract governing the relationship between the workers and the grower
in Real v. DSA was called a "Patent Sublicense and Subcontract for Growing
Strawberry Crop with Sublicensee."6' Although the court did not directly question
55See Arnold, supra note 1.56Id. Arnold interviewed a representative of Veg-a-Mix, a California vegetable broker that
frequently deals with immigrants. The representative acknowledged that although their
contracts are written in English, they contain a disclaimer "written in Spanish" admonishing
farmworkers to have someone translate the contract and to be sure to understand it. The
representative also stated that "maybe they (farmworkers) don't read English, but their kids do."
Id. Since refusing to sign a contract or bargaining for better terms are not options for an
immigrant farmer in need of work, it makes little difference whether the farmer understands the
terms of the contract or not. In addition, relying on children to understand and translate a
contract for their parents does not constitute a reasonable business practice.
57Id.; see also Wells, Legal Conflict, supra note 22, at 65. Wells writes that according to
interviews and court affidavits filed by sharecroppers, many "do not understand the detailed
terms of the contract." Id.
58 Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1979).
"See Real, 603 F.2d at 748. For a different perspective on Driscoll's strawberry
sharecropping contracts, see supra note 9.
60Real, 603 F.2d at 755. The farmworkers in Real appealed the decision of the district
court granting summary judgment to the grower. Id. at 750. Although the farmworkers' original
complaint included charges of antitrust and contract violations, the complaint was later
amended to include wage violations under the FLSA. Id. The FLSA violation was based on the
allegation that the agreement between the farmworkers and DSA was a "sham." Id. The FLSA
violation was the only issue the farmworkers appealed. For a discussion of the original and
amended complaint of the farmworkers in Real, see Wells, Legal Conflict, supra note 22, at 66-
69. 6 Real, 603 F.2d at 750.
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the ability of the workers to understand the intricacies of the "Patent Sublicense
and Subcontract," the court did note that
[t]he Agreement, written in English, consists of seventeen, legal-size pages
containing much legal terminology. The appellants, all Spanish-speakers,
allegedly never have mastered the English language. In most cases, a sublicensee
signs the Agreement only once. Thereafter, the parties annually extend the
Agreement by means of a one to two-page "addendum"' signed by [the parties].62
The agreement repeatedly referred to the sublicensees as "independent
contractor[s]" and stated that none of the other parties "has assumed under this
agreement any rights of supervision and control over the growing of said
strawberry crop. 63
By classifying the farmworkers as "independent contractors" and "parrot[ing]
language in cases distinguishing independent contractors from employees," DSA
apparently was attempting to avoid entering a traditional employer-employee
relationship with the workers, which would have required compliance with the
FLSA.6 The Real court stated, however, that "contractual language... [was] not
conclusive in the circumstances presented. .. "65 As did previous courts
addressing the issue of whether a worker was an independent contractor or
employee, the court examined the "[elconomic realities, not contractual labels" of
the Real-DSA working relationship.
66
Of the economic realities that were relied upon to reverse the lower court's
decision that the farmworkers were not employees, the element of control appears
to have been the most important.67 The defendant had "substantial control over
important aspects of the [plaintiffs'] work," including the ability to fire a
worker.6' According to the farmworkers' affidavits, a foreman controlled their
"activities in growing and harvesting the strawberries, especially in operations
requiring substantial business judgment."69
62Id. at 750 n.1. The workers, (referred to as "Sub-licensees"), a "Contractor," Donald J.
Driscoll, and the "third-party beneficiary" DSA all signed the Agreement. Id. at 750.63Id. at 751.
6See id. at 755.
65 Id
66Id. (citing Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1947) and its
analysis of the employment relationship under the FLSA).
671d at 750,755.
6 1d. at 755.69 Id. at 752-53. The foreman decided when farmworkers would fertilize, prune, weed, and
pick their strawberries and acted as a supervisor of the farmworkers. Id. at 753 n. Il (citing an
excerpt of the farmworkers' affidavits). The foreman, referred to as Mukai, surveyed the work
sharecroppers had done and made them replant improperly placed berry plants; he also
telephoned workers who had not arrived on time during picking hours or had not properly
weeded their plots. A worker explained that when he had questioned any of the foreman's
decisions, the foreman "always lets me know that he can take the strawberries away from me
[Vol. 62:16651674
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The court looked at other factors in the working relationship, including
(1) the farmworkers' "opportunity for profit or loss depending
upon... managerial skill;" (2) the parties' "investment in equipment or materials
required;" (3) "whether the service rendered requires a special skill;" (4) "the
degree of permanence of the working relationship;" and (5) "whether the service
rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business." 70 As with the
element of control, these elements likewise supported a finding that the
farmworkers were not independent of the foreman or DSA.7'
The facts of Real v. DSA allowed no other conclusion but that the plaintiffs
were employees of the defendant despite contractual attempts to classify them as
independent contractors. Although many contracts establishing sharecropping
arrangements are analyzed according to the Real factors, courts do not always
reach the same conclusion. 72 These agreements propose to set up workers and
owners as two independent parties, but looking at the circumstances and the
economic reality of the situations reveals that the owners are actually employing
the workers and are using the independent classification to avoid their legal
responsibilities to their employees.73
In Donovan v. Brandel, a sharecropping contract challenge brought by the
Department of Labor (DOL), the Sixth Circuit applied the same six factors as the
Ninth Circuit in Real v. DSA,74 but concluded that the farmworkers were
and that I have to do what he says. It is my personal understanding that if [the foreman] does
not like the way I am using my plot, he can fire me." Id. The ability of the farmworkers to "hire
and control" helpers during busy times under the agreement did not interfere with the
substantial control exercised by DSA over the majority of the farmworkers' activities. Id. at
755. 701d. at 754. The court noted that these were only some of the factors used by courts for
"distinguishing employees from independent contractors for purposes of social legislation such
as the FLSA." Id.; see also Glader, supra note 8, at 1475-76, discussing the six factor test used
in Real.71 Real, 603 F.2d at 755.72See Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1117 (6th Cir. 1984) (analyzing a
sharecropping contract under the six Real factors).
73 See Arnold, supra note 1. According to the author
[B]y setting up these immigrants as independent farmers, the vegetable-broker companies
avoid legal responsibility for regulations.... 'they have a perfect defense that if any
claims come up, they stop at the supposed independent grower instead of going up above
to an entity with deeper pockets that may actually be in control .... [T]hey serve as a
shield to legal liability.
Id.
74Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1117 & n.5 (listing the six factors used for determining employee
or independent contractor status).
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independent contractors rather than employees of the farm owner.!5 The
sharecroppers in Brandel were hired to harvest cucumbers, a labor-intensive
task 76 The defendant farm owner claimed to have used a sharecropping
arrangement with the workers in order to "delegat[e] to, the migrant workers the
responsibility of supervising their own field labor."
77
The court accepted the rationale that by using a sharecropping agreement,
where workers are paid based on profits earned rather than at a fixed hourly rate,
the farmworkers would be motivated to use greater care in their harvesting.7' This
care and "knowledge of... methods of maximizing production constituted a
skill," indicating greater independence than employee farmworkers would
possess.79 Despite the care farmworkers had to exercise, the actual skill required
to harvest cucumbers seems to be minimal because children of the workers
actively assisted their parents in the fields. 0 A skill that children readily develop
cannot be so specialized that it precludes an employment relationship."
The workers' capital investment is a second factor that the Brandel court
incorrectly used to support its decision that the farmworkers were independent
contractors rather than employees.8 2 The Brandel workers supplied their own
gloves and pails, which the court characterized as the workers' "capital
investment. 83 Brandel, in contrast, had invested in a grading station, tractors,
trucks, and an irrigation system.84 The court noted the disparity between
Brandel's and the workers' overall capital investments, but then separated the
75Id. at 1120 ("[v]iewing the entire circumstances of the relationship" and "construing the
term 'employee' with reference to the purposes of the FLSA," the court affirmed that the
workers were not employees); see also LINDER, MIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 31, at 235-42.76 See Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1116.
77 Id. at 1118; see also Linder, Employees, supra note 29, at 468.78 Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1118. Presumably, making farmworkers' earnings depend upon the
quality of their labor avoids the cost of field supervision. See ROYCE, supra note 39, at 8. A
farmworker with "an interest in the crop and an incentive to work diligently" creates less
"supervision costs" for the landowner. Id. For criticism of the Sixth Circuit's analysis of the
skill factor, see LINDER, MIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 31, at 238-39. Linder argues that
supervision of harvesting is necessary "only because the combination of low hourly wages and
arduousness invites shirking." Id. at 238. The meager wages and the difficulty of the work, as
well as the fact that many agricultural businesses employ foremen to supervise sharecroppers,
suggest that these arrangements are strategies for businesses to keep their costs low that
ultimately take advantage of workers. Id.; see also Wells, Legal Conflict, supra note 22, at 54
(discussing the use of sharecropping arrangements for labor-intensive produce in an effort to
make farrnworkers exercise greater care in their work).
79Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1118.
8o Id. at 1116-17 (stating that parents train their children to "progress gradually to an active
role in the harvesting").
81 See Glader, supra note 8, at 1481.
12 Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1118-19.
83 Id. at 1118; see also Linder, Employees, supra note 29, at 452.
84Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1118 & n.8.
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capital equipment according to its role at the different stages of the growing
process." As a distinct stage in the growing process, harvesting required only
pails and gloves, the equipment the workers supplied.8 6 Ignoring the equipment
that was necessary to raise and market cucumbers and limiting its focus only to
the equipment needed for harvesting, the court accepted that "the relatively small
investment by the migrant workers did not require a finding of an employment
relationship."
87
The opposing decisions in Real and Brandel, cases presenting similar facts,
reveal the inconsistent and unfair results of using a case-by-case analysis of
sharecropping agreements.8 In addition, decisions such as the one in Brandel
often leave poor farmworkers with no legal recourse; after the Sixth Circuit's
decision, many attorneys became reluctant to pursue farmworkers' claims.89 For
as long as courts continue to apply the six-factor test on a case-by-case basis,
many workers will be at risk of receiving an unfair decision under the application
of the test established in Brandel.90
IV. EXISTING LEGISLATION
There are two statutes that establish rights and protections for immigrant
farmworkers, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Workers' Protection Act (AWPA).9' In addition, the Farm Labor
Contractor Registration Act (FLCRA), which was repealed and replaced by
AWPA in 1983, was an early attempt by Congress to regulate the conditions of
851d. at 1118. For example, Brandel used trucks for hauling produce to market, and "the
hauling of [cucumbers] to market is a function separate from harvesting of the crop." Id.
' See id. at 1119.
87Id. at 1118. The Sixth Circuit limited its conclusion to the specific facts of Brandel,
noting that workers' capital investment "may be important in other contexts." Id. at 1119. But
see LINDER, MIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 31, at 235. In his sweeping criticism of the
Brandel decision, Linder accuses the Brandel court of "fumish[ing] the first solid judicial
support for sharecropping, which turned out to be the high-water mark in agricultural
employers' efforts to persuade the courts that unskilled and capital-less workers are not
employees." Id.; see also Linder, Employees, supra note 29, at 468 (The court overlooked "the
defining characteristic of sharecropping," that the crop, the market risk, and the profits are
shared between the workers and the farm owner. This essential characteristic of sharing was
absent from the Brandel arrangement.).
88 See Glader, supra note 8, at 1477-78.
89Linder, Employees, supra note 29, at 440 (finding that some attorneys in the Sixth
Circuit no longer challenge sharecropping arrangements and instead advise workers to take tax
deductions as self-employed individuals).
9°For additional discussion of Brandel and criticism of the Sixth Circuit's analysis, see
Linder, Employees, supra note 29, at 440,452,468.
9'Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§201-219 (1994); Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1994).
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employment for many immigrant farmworkers and to protect workers from
abuses by large agricultural employers.92
A. The Fair Labor Standards Act
Workers who are independent contractors are not considered to be employees
under the FLSA, so employers using independent contractors are not required to
comply with the FLSA's provisions93 Employers thus have an incentive to
classify workers as independent contractors because this classification will be
more convenient and less expensive for them.94
When the FLSA was originally enacted in 1938, the Act did not include
farmworkers. 95 The 1966 amendments to the Act extended coverage to
farmworkers; but even with this protection, different, less rigorous standards
apply to farmworkers.
9 6
One potential source of abuse under the FLSA stems from the family farm
exemption. 7 Despite limits imposed upon child labor, the FLSA does not include
children when they work for an "immediate family" member.9 When
farmworkers are classified as independent contractors, their children who work
along with them are not considered to be employees working for the agricultural
company.9 9 Under this system of classification, "the child labor provisions and
92Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 88-582, 78 Stat. 920 (1964)
(repealed 1983). Varner, supra note 30, provides a comprehensive history of the FLCRA and
the AWPA which I have relied upon here. Farm labor contractors, also referred to as
"crewleaders," are often used by agricultural businesses to recruit farmworkers. Varner, supra
note 30, at 435. Crewleaders are also classified as independent contractors, rather than
employees, and are frequently given responsibility for protecting workers and for any FLSA
violations that occur. Glader, supra note 8, at 1472. The structure of this employment
relationship creates additional difficulties, however, when farmworkers later attempt to get
wages they are owed from crewleaders who are often undercapitalized or simply hard to find.
Id.; see also Michael G. Tierce, Note, The Joint Employer Doctrine Under the Federal Migrant
and Seasonal Workers Protection Act, 18 RUTGERs L.J. 863, 868 (1987) (noting the FLCRA
was enacted in response to abusive situations in relationships between crew leaders and
farmworkers).
93Glader, supra note 8, at 1456. Examples of FLSA provisions that do not apply to
independent contractors include "health and safety standards, unemployment and disability
insurance, and... protections against oppressive child labor." Id.94Id. For example, an employer of farmworkers is responsible for providing amenities
such as field toilets and an adequate supply of drinking water. If a farmworker is classified as an
independent contractor, however, the alleged employer is not responsible for these supplies or
their costs. See Arnold, supra note 1.95 Glader, supra note 8, at 1460.96Id. at 1462 (citing comments by Representative Edward R. Roybal that different,
presumably lower, child labor, employee tax, and housing standards apply to farmworkers).
9729 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6)(B) (1994); Glader, supra note 8, at 1464-65.
9829 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6)(B).
99 Glader, supra note 8, at 1464-65.
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other protections afforded 'employees' do not apply. .. [so] children,
who... work in the fields, are left unprotected from the abuses of oppressive
child labor."'100
Donovan v. Brandel further illustrates the problem of using a worker's
classification as an employee or an independent contractor to determine the
applicability of the FLSA's child labor prohibitions. In Brandel, the Secretary of
Labor alleged violations of the FLSA's child labor provisions by the defendant
farm owner.'01 The court's analysis focused on whether the farmworkers were
employees of the defendant and thus protected by the FLSA.'02 Except for briefly
mentioning that children played and worked in the fields with their parents, the
Sixth Circuit never addressed the underlying issue of child labor in the case.'0 3
Upon concluding that the workers were not employees, the court ended its
inquiry.104 The independent contractor label insulated the defendant from liability
for any child labor violations he may have committed under the FLSA.
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted broadly the terms of the
FLSA to serve the remedial purpose of the Act.'05 Addressing the need to broadly
construe the Act's terms, the Court noted that construing "employment" and
"employee" narrowly "would invite adroit schemes by some employers and
employees to avoid the immediate burdens at the expense of the benefits sought
by the legislation.'
10 6
B. Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act
The FLCRA sought to assist farmworkers by requiring crewleaders to
register with the DOL.'0 7 By attempting to regulate crewleaders instead of the
agricultural businesses that employed the crewleaders, the legislation seemed to
'O0 Id. at 1465 (footnote.omitted). Glader explains that "[u]nder the family farm exemption,
even children under twelve are allowed to work in the fields without any federal regulation of
hours or working conditions .... So long as a child is employed by a parent on a farm
nominally owned or 'operated' by the parent, and works outside of normal school hours, there
is no age or hour limitation on the child's agricultural labor." Id. (footnote omitted). Glader
advocates removing the family farm exemption so that agricultural companies with child
employees will have to comply with the regulations that apply to other employers who hire
children. Id. at 1487.
' oBrandel, 736 F.2d at 1115; see also Glader, supra note 8, at 1480.
'




05Glader, supra note 8, at 1469.
'
06Id. (quoting United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704,712 (1946)).07Vamer, supra note 30, at 435-36. Registration requirements included "giving
information regarding [the crewleader's] method of operation as a contractor... [and]
provid[ing] proof of public liability insurance, or proof of financial responsibility, for all
vehicles used in the business." Id. at 436 (footnote omitted).
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leave farmworkers still open to abuses.' °8 Amendments to the FLCRA in 1974
were unsuccessful at ending continuing abuses, and the Act was repealed in
1983.109
C. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act
The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act replaced the
FLCRA in 1983.10 Most importantly, the AWPA makes agricultural businesses
as well as crewleaders responsible for complying with worker protection laws."'
This shared responsibility resembles courts' use of the joint-employer doctrine in
cases involving allegations of crewleader and agricultural business FLSA
violations. 
12
The AWPA divides agricultural workers into two separate categories,
migrant and seasonal.'1 3 Migrant workers have to "be absent overnighf' from
their permanent homes while working, and seasonal workers perform agricultural
work but do not need to be absent overnight.' 4 The AWPA workers' protections
require agricultural employers to inform workers in writing about wages, the
duration of employment, the nature of the work, and any other relevant conditions
or benefits.'1" Employers also need to display in the workplace a DOL-provided
poster that informs workers of their rights under the AWPA." 6 Perhaps most
importantly, the poster and the written statement about wages and conditions
must be in the workers' language."
7
Despite congressional attempts to prevent agricultural employers facing
AWPA actions from proffering the independent contractor defense, 8 agricultural
10829 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1994); see also Tierce, supra note 92, at 869 ("It is generally
agreed that FLRCA failed to achieve its objective of improving the working conditions of the
migrant farm worker.'); Vamer, supra note 30, at 435.
'
0 9Vamer, supra note 30, at 436-37. Vamer notes that although the amended FLCRA
created a private right of action for farmworkers and expanded the Department of Labor's
authority, agricultural businesses also attempted to add weakening amendments to the FLCRA.
Id.
"Id. at 437. The AWPA was passed in an effort to end abuses of farmworkers that had
continued under the FLCRA. Id.
.. Id.; see also Tierce, supra note 92, at 871.
1 2 See Glader, supra note 8, at 1472-74 (discussing thejoint-employer doctrine).
"'29 U.S.C. § 1802 (1994).
14 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1802(8)(A), (10)(A) (1994); see also Vamer, supra note 30, at 438.
"529 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1831 (1994). This information must be in a written form. Id.
11629 U.S.C. §§ 1821(b), 1831(b) (1994).
17 29 U.S.C. §§ 1821(g), 1831(f) (1994); see also Vamer, supra note 30, at 439.
18 Vamer, supra note 30, at 440 ("Congress envisioned that defendant-growers would
seek to avoid liability for AWPA violations by [asserting] ... that the worker is an independent
contractor .... 'It was the intent of the congressional Committee that any attempt to evade the
responsibilities imposed by AWPA through spurious agreements among such parties be
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employers have managed to "avoid liability for AWPA violations" using this
strategy 9 Because the AWPA only protects employees, an agricultural
employer that convinces a court that a plaintiff is in fact an independent contractor
cannot be held responsible for any alleged violations of the Act. 120 The relative
success of the independent contractor defense is problematic, however, because
the legislative history of the AWPA indicates that the Act was to be interpreted
like the FLSA, to achieve its "remedial purposes. 12'
V. EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT REGULATIONS AND REMEDIES
An analysis of the use of sharecropping arrangements that impose
independent contractor status upon immigrant farmworkers reveals that such
arrangements are simply a guise for agricultural employers to avoid responsibility
for workers and liability for violations that occur during the course of the working
relationship. 122 Despite repeated attempts to provide protection for workers,
123
abuses continue to be permitted under the independent contractor label. These
continued abuses suggest that there are broader social forces that influence
legislatures' and courts' approaches to handling an issue that overwhelmingly
affects immigrants.
24
A. The Ineffectiveness of Current Legislation and Judicial Decisions
The relative success of the independent contractor defense indicates that the
guidelines provided by the FLSA and AWPA give courts too much flexibility
when determining whether the label "independent contractor" or "employee"
should be applied to a plaintiff farmworker.'2 1 As the Sixth Circuit's decision in
rendered meaningless .... ") (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 7 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547,4553).
"19 d. ("Despite Congress' warnings, nothing has prevented powerful growers from
asserting superficial defenses to liability."). Vamer cites Donovan v. Brandel as one of the
successful independent contractor defenses of AWPA violations. Id. at 440 n.84.
120 Id. at 440.
121Id at 441 (noting that the broad construction given to terms such as "employ,"
"independent contractor," "employee," and "employer," under the FLSA "are also applicable to
AWPA provisions").
122 See generally Linder, Employees, supra note 29; Glader, supra note 8; Varner, supra
note 30.
12The FLCRA and AWPA were enacted in response to farmworker abuses.
'
24 See generally Linder, Employees, supra note 29; Glader, supra note 8; Vamer, supra
note 30. The prevalence of nativism, defined as "intense opposition to an internal minority on
the grounds of its foreign .... [or] 'unAmerican,' connections" suggests public apathy, if not
actual dislike, toward immigrants and the employment difficulties they encounter in the United
States. Valetk, supra note 38, at 147.
125See Linder, Employees, supra note 29, at 440-41 (advocating the adoption of a per se
rule classifying migrant farmworkers as employees); see also Glader, supra note 8, at 1487-88.
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Brandel indicates, courts applying the current six-factor economic realities test
may reach the incorrect conclusion about a farmworker's status. 26
Legislative and judicial remedies are particularly ineffective for assisting
immigrant workers because many of the workers are also undocumented.
127
Violations of employee protection laws are more likely to occur when employers
hire undocumented workers. 128 Because recently arrived, undocumented workers
frequently have rural backgrounds and high illiteracy rates,129 they become a part
of the "underground economy,"'"3 accepting jobs that most Americans will not
take.13' Not surprisingly, undocumented workers often seek employment in the
agricultural industry.'32 Fearful of being discovered and deported, these workers
are even less likely to assert their rights.133
B. Public Attitudes About Immigration
Public attitudes about immigration are usually connected to overall economic
conditions.3 When the U.S. economy is slow, immigrants often become targets
of blame and public outrage.135 After substantial criticism of immigration policy
126 See supra notes 74-90 and accompanying text (discussing Brandel v. Donovan, 736
F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1984)).
127See Glader, supra note 8, at 1458 (noting that because these workers do not have access
to legal services, they cannot protect themselves.).
128 Gordon, supra note 39, at 416 (stating that even though the FLSA and other legislation,
such as Title VII and state workers' compensation laws, include undocumented workers, these
statutes have not helped these individuals).
1291d. at 413.
13 0 Id. at 412. "Underground" jobs in agriculture, or in restaurants or factories, are "outside
the realm of the law," meaning that employers do not comply with labor laws, do not pay taxes,
and do not have mandatory insurance, workers' compensation, or disability benefits. Employers
in the underground economy prefer to hire undocumented workers. Id. at 412-13.
"' See Pete Hamill, Rights, and Wrongs, ofPassage, TIME INT'L EDITION, Jan. 22, 2001, at
56.
132 See id.
133 Undocumented workers are unlikely to complain to employers or government agencies
about violations of worker protection laws out of fear of losing their jobs as well as being
deported. Gordon, supra note 39, at 414 n.27; see also Hamill, supra note 131, at 56 ("A
worker without a green card is a worker who can be intimidated, cheated or defrauded.");
Margot Roosevelt, illegal but Fighting for Rights, TIME, Jan. 22, 2001, at 68-69 (AFL-CIO
statement that "courageous undocumented workers who come forward to assert their rights
should not be faced with deportation").
134 Valetk, supra note 38, at 145 ("[rjhe intensity of feelings toward immigrants is closely
linked to economic conditions and suggest[s] that racial prejudice is stimulated in economic
recessions. In addition, some have concluded that opposition to immigration rises and falls with
the unemployment Tate......).
135 Id. at 144 ("Immigrants, as a politically weak group, are convenient and tangible targets
for blame.!). There seems to be little logic, however, in blaming immigrants for taking jobs
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and calls for reforming immigration law,136 the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act (URIRA) was passed in 1996137 in response to
anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States.
13
The goal of immigration policy under the IIRJRA was to promote
immigrants' self-sufficiency and to decrease their dependence on public
assistance. 139 Providing public assistance, in particular to undocumented workers,
has been especially unpopular.140 It is far from certain, however, that receiving
public assistance benefits is an incentive to move to the United States.'
4
'
Nevertheless, it is clear that anti-immigration attitudes among the general
population affect the way legislatures handle issues affecting immigrants.' 42
The policy behind the IIRTRA is also bound to affect the manner in which
courts handle grievances brought by immigrant workers. A challenged
sharecropping contract purporting to make an immigrant farmworker independent
and self-sufficient appears consistent with the goals the IIRIRA endorses. A court
from Americans because it is generally recognized that immigrant workers will accept work
that American workers do not want. See Roosevelt, supra note 133, at 69.
136 Valetk, supra note 38, at 144. United States immigration policy was criticized as being
"a complex web of loosely related laws, regulations and procedures." Id.
1388 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1646 (Supp. 1997).
139 See Valetk, supra note 38, at 142-45.
'
39 The statement of national policy set forth at the beginning of the statute makes the
combined goals of increased self-sufficiency and decreased reliance upon public assistance
clear.
[I]t is the immigration policy of the United States that aliens within the Nation's borders
not depend on public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities
and the resources of their families, their sponsors, and private organizations, and the
availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United
States.
8 U.S.C. § 1601(2) (1994); see also Valetk, supra note 38, at 148.
140Valetk, supra note 38, at 152.
41Id. at 153. As noted by Arnold and Parrish, many individuals enter into sharecropping
contracts because they are seen as a way to develop independence and self-sufficiency. Parrish,
supra note 7. This desire to be independent and self-supporting undercuts the argument that it is
the promise of receiving public assistance that provides an incentive to immigrate. In addition,
Valetk notes "push factors," such as poverty and unemployment, and the "pull factor" of U.S.
employers' need for workers lead to Mexicans entering the U.S. in search of work and better
opportunities. Valetk, supra note 38, at 160.
142See Gordon, supra note 39, at 416-17 (noting a lack of political will to create a system
to protect workers). Exploitation of workers, particularly undocumented workers, results from
government unwillingness to pass and administer protective labor laws. Id. at 427. Since
immigrants are a politically weak group, they have limited power to represent their own needs,
and it is unlikely that a significant number of American citizens will become advocates of
immigrant farmworker protection laws. See Vamer, supra note 30, at 468.
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may favor an arrangement that fosters this independence, even if there are FLSA
and AWPA violations underlying the working relationship.
143
In addition, common attitudes expressing anger or resentment toward
immigrants also appear at times to color judicial perspectives of immigrant
issues. 44 With legislatures and judges subject to anti-immigrant biases, it is not
surprising that the AWPA, as well as the FLSA, has failed to protect the group it
was passed to assist.
C. Labor Reasons for Immigration
Despite the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiments, there are other factors
that actually encourage immigration to the United States.14 In certain industries
and at certain times, there is a need for "cheap and permanent labor."
146
Agriculture is one such industry.
147
For example, when there is a need for cheap labor at harvest time, the borders
between the United States and Mexico open up more easily.148 Even though there
may be a demand for greater restriction of immigration, politicians may not be
willing to respond in a way that will too drastically limit the number of available
141 The IIRIRA's policy may make it easier for a court to interpret a sharecropping contract
as an opportunity for an immigrant to achieve financial independence, rather than as a scheme
designed to benefit the alleged employer.
'4See Glader, supra note 8, at 1478 (noting that "erroneous attitudes and insensitivity"
toward farmworkers may affect litigation.); see also id. at 1481 (quoting a U.S. Department of
Labor administrative law judge's comment that it is natural for children of migrant workers to
accompany their parents in the fields rather than attend school because the children probably do
not understand what is happening in their classrooms).
145 See Valetk, supra note 38, at 160; see also Hamill, supra note 131, at 56 (noting that
poverty pushes people from Mexico to immigrate to the United States, and the availability of
jobs "calls them"); Tim Weiner, In a World at Floodtide, An Effort to Lift the Gate a Bit, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, at 4-1 ("For decades, the economic gap between the two nations has
driven millions of Mexicans to work for minimum wages or less in the United States.
Americans reaped the rewards of that labor, so many ignored illegal immigration.").
146 Valetk, supra note 38, at 160. U.S. businesses have always depended on "cheap foreign
labor," such as slave labor in the South and Chinese railroad workers. Id. at 163. This
dependence has continued. For example, the hotel industry in Nevada, as well as the
agricultural industry in California, would be hard-pressed to find replacements for their
employees who have immigrated, legally or not, from Mexico. Weiner, supra note 145.
1
47 Id. at 160. One economic analysis posits that 'servile labor systems,' including
sharecropping, depend upon the existence of three factors: "a class of large landholders, a
shortage of labor, and a level of technology not so advanced that it provides incentives to
mechanization." ROYCE, supra note 39, at 3. These three factors are present when large
agricultural businesses are seeking workers to raise their more fragile crops, such as
strawberries and cucumbers.
148Valetk, supra note 38, at 161. "[L]arge-scale agricultural production still depends on
Mexican workers for its profits, and that is why the borders remain porous and why legislators
have been slow to act." Id. at 163.
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workers. 149 Politicians recognize that they "owe their seats to the patronage of
right-wing manufacturing and agribusiness interests desirous of... low minimum
wage and unfettered access to cheap, nonunion labor from the Third World."' °50
A recent INS enforcement effort illustrates the power employers of
immigrant workers, even undocumented workers, possess to bend immigration
law in the employers' favor. In September of 1998, the INS began investigating
undocumented immigrants working in Nebraska slaughterhouses.' 5 ' When the
majority of the employees stopped coming to work, leaving the slaughterhouses
understaffed, factory owners and ranchers complained about their significant
financial losses. I5 2 As a result, "local politicians attacked the operation, and the
INS backed down."' 53 State officials went as far as advocating a broad policy of
amnesty for undocumented workers, and INS agents did not pursue
undocumented workers in the slaughterhouses for over a year.'
5 4
The influence Nebraska slaughterhouse owners, ranchers, and politicians
exerted over the INS ultimately protected the immigrant workers and their jobs.
The power those employers exerted over the INS, however, is troubling.
Avoiding compliance with immigration law suggests that employers are able to
manipulate employment and labor regulations to their advantage as well. 5 Thus,
even though an immigrant worker is supposed to be protected under the FLSA
and the AWPA, an employer may be able to justify infringements of those Acts
by pointing to potential economic losses as the Nebraska ranchers and
'
49Id. at 163-64. "[L]egislators know that illegal immigration is only marginally an issue
of law enforcement and fundamentally a labor-market event." Id. at 164.
1501d. at 164; see also ROYCE, supra note 39, at 3 (Maintenance of a labor system such as
sharecropping also "requires ... that landholders possess sufficient political power.").
151 Roosevelt, supra note 133, at 69. The INS subpoenaed employment records for nearly
5,000 workers and informed the slaughterhouses that agents would interview employees about
"discrepancies in their documents." Id.; see also Valetk, supra note 38, at 156-57 (discussing
illegal aliens employed in the meat-packing industry).
1'2 Roosevelt, supra note 133, at 69. Factory owners were significantly short of workers,
and Nebraska cattle ranchers claimed that the resulting loss totaled twenty million dollars over
eight months. Id.
15 3 Id. This situation in Nebraska supports the proposition that there is no political will to
create a system to protect undocumented workers at various levels of government. See also
Gordon, supra note 39, at 416-17.
154 Roosevelt, supra note 133, at 69; see also Gordon, supra note 39, at 417 ("[N]ational
and state governments have failed to enforce labor laws protecting immigrant workers.").
'
55Although the slaughterhouse employers were at odds with the INS in this case,
employers also use the threat of INS investigations to control their undocumented employees.
Workers who complain to employers about low wages or unsafe conditions frequently back
down when the employer threatens "an INS bust." Roosevelt, supra note 133, at 69. According
to filmmaker Michael Moore, "[c]ompanies across America love illegal aliens until they get
uppity and ask for a few more cents." Id.; see also Gordon, supra note 39, at 414 n.27 (noting
that employers do not worry about documentation when hiring workers but later threaten to use
that illegal status against a worker complaining about unsafe conditions).
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slaughterhouses did. 56 A strict policy of regulating immigration and
undocumented workers directly conflicts with many employers' hiring needs,
especially for less desirable jobs.157
Overall, public sentiment toward issues affecting immigrants is rather harsh.
The incentive, particularly in agricultural states, to allow abuses of immigrant
workers to continue seems to explain why attempts to protect workers, such as the
FLCRA, have not worked. These two factors may also explain why the broad
enforcement that the AWPA requires in order to be effective has not occurred15 8
Finally, protecting farmworkers simply may be seen as unnecessary due to the
persistence of the myth that agricultural work is healthy, wholesome labor.'5 9 It is
a common misconception that farm work, even when performed by children, is
not "hard, difficult, or dangerous labor."160 People do not protest unfair working
conditions for farm laborers, nor do they demand regulation or improvement as
they do of sweatshop labor.1
6 1
VI. PROPOSALS
Helping immigrant farmworkers who enter into contracts with agricultural
businesses to receive a fair deal could be achieved with legislative and judicial
reform. 62 Given that employers have managed to avoid liability under existing
statutes and that courts have been willing to enforce agreements under which
fannworkers are independent contractors rather than employees, it appears that a
different remedy is needed. Increasing public awareness of the difficulties
I56In the agricultural industry, "large-scale... production still depends on Mexican
workers for its profits.' Valetk, supra note 38, at 163; see also Gordon, supra note 39, at 417
(stating that laws regulating immigration and employment have made people afraid of losing
jobs and being deported). Laws function this way because "[m]any in big business view the
existence of a cheap, exploitable labor force as an economic necessity. . . [Tihis sector would
oppose a rack-down on labor violations against immigrant workers." Id.
157 See Valetk, supra note 38, at 163; see also Gordon, supra note 39, at 417.
.
5 See Vamer, supra note 30, at 439.
"
5 9 See Glader, supra note 8, at 1460.
"
6
'Id. at 1463. Agriculture "is the third most dangerous" industry after mining and
construction. Id. The risk of injury from farm work is high and ranges from exposure to
pesticides to the physically demanding and time-intensive nature of the work. See id.61 d. at 1462. Glader focuses in particular on immigrant children working on farms,
asserting that even though the public is generally outraged by child sweatshop labor, child
agricultural labor does not upset people in the same way, and they do not seem to pay attention
to the problem. Id. The public's acceptance of children performing farm work comes from the
traditional image of the family farm where everyone contributes to labor. Id at 1465.
'
62Id. at 1477 (stating that it would be better if courts or legislatures would create "a
presumption that migrant farmworkers are employees and not independent contractors"); see
also Linder, Employees, supra note 29, at 440-41(advocating creation of a per se rule rather




farmworkers encounter is one way to bring attention to the issue and perhaps to
encourage people to support, if not demand, greater protection and fairer
treatment of immigrant farmworkers. 163 Ultimately, farmworkers should follow
the example being set by immigrants in other industries; by organizing
themselves or aligning themselves with existing unions,' 64 such as United
Farmworkers (UFW), farmworkers will be able to exert greater strength when
dealing with large agricultural businesses.
165
Amending current legislation or enacting an entirely new statute so that
vulnerable agricultural workers have better protection is an option; however, the
relative failure of past legislative efforts indicates that statutory reform is not the
best solution. The FLSA was amended and the AWPA was enacted specifically
to address abuses endured by farmworkers, yet employers still manage to avoid
liability under these Acts. 66 As the Supreme Court cautioned in United States v.
Silk, employers have created "adroit schemes... at the expense of the benefits
sought by the legislation."'
167
Any new legislation must clearly address the "scheme" of labeling
farmworkers as independent in contracts and establish that an immigrant
farmworker is not an independent contractor, but an employee subject to the
protections the FLSA and the AWPA provide. 6 In addition, new legislation also
163 See Varner, supra note 30, at 468 (stating that public outcry is needed). Public attitudes
about immigrant issues, however, will be difficult to change.
164 See generally Roosevelt, supra note 133, at 69-70 (describing deliverymen and hotel
workers vho received union assistance with their grievances against employers). "[Workers]
are joining the unions that once stigmatized them as a threat to American jobs .... [and] [n]o
institution is defending them more eagerly than Big Labor ...... "Id at 68. As one union leader
stated, "We don't care about green cards .... We care about union cards." Id
165Susan Ferriss & George Raine, Strawberry Fields Forever United?, THE S.F.
ExAMINER, Nov. 24, 1996, at B-1. United Farmworkers launched a campaign to organize
strawberry pickers in California, many of whom are Mexican immigrants, and to publicize the
plight of the workers, who sometimes stoop over strawberry plants for as long as twelve hours a
day during the six- to eight-month growing season. Id. Owners of strawberry fields claimed that
the union had "exaggerat[ed] descriptions of living and working conditions of the workers" and
that only a 'small percentage of growers' treated workers unfairly. Id. UFW organizers
responded that growers and their field supervisors had "scared workers with warnings that
companies might fold rather than negotiate UFW contracts." Id. In addition, the Strawberry
Workers and Farmers Alliance, a group organized by employers and managed by a Los
Angeles public relations firm, has held anti-union marches. Id.
166See Glader, supra note 8, at 1467 (noting that agricultural employers evade liability
under the FLSA "by manipulating the formal designation of their relationship with their
migrant workforce").
'
671d. at 1469 (quoting United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 712 (1946)); see supra notes
110-11 and accompanying text.
168See Glader, supra note 8, at 1480 (arguing legislatures should make decisions about




needs to give courts better guidelines to follow than the six-factor test they
normally apply when making employee-independent contractor
determinations. 169 As the Donovan v. Brandel decision indicates, the six factors
presently used do not always help courts in reaching the correct decision about a
farnworker's status or an agricultural employer's liability.
170
Deterrence of abuses by agricultural employers is another possible benefit of
legislation establishing that immigrant farmworkers are employees. Farmworkers
currently have few options for enforcing their rights,17 1 so an employer's risk of
being held accountable for a violation is minimal.' 72 The unpredictability of the
current six-factor test also discourages workers who are interested in bringing
claims against employers. 73 If, however, agricultural employers incurred liability
for treating immigrant farmworkers as independent contractors, those employers
might be less willing to take that risk.
Any legislative attempt to correct current injustices perpetrated against
immigrant farnworkers will require public support. Building greater public
awareness of the hardships immigrant farmworkers endure' 74 and changing
attitudes about immigrants in the American workforce will undoubtedly be
difficult. 71 Still, as the public becomes more informed about the violations
employers commit against their immigrant workforces; as people realize that
permitting employers to evade worker protection regulations threatens all
employees, not only immigrant and undocumented workers; and as the public
sees that the experiences of immigrants today resemble the experiences of
6 9 Id. at 1469 (Currently, "there is no legislative guidance as to when an agricultural
worker properly is deemed to be an independent contractor rather than an employee.").
170 See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text (discussing Donovan v. Brandel, 736
F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1984)).
171Glader, supra note 8, at 1458 (noting that workers do not have access to legal services,
so they cannot protect themselves or have their rights enforced).
72 See Linder, Employees, supra note 29, at 437 ("[An agricultural] company may
calculate that the employees' immediate incentives to sue it are so small that the benefits of
continuing violation of the FLSA exceed the costs ... [and] farmworkers lose their resolve to
resist such violations of the few employment rights they possess."); see also Glader, supra note
8, at 1477 (noting that the case-by-case analysis employed by courts makes it more likely that
employers will risk using the independent contractor status because it is unlikely that a worker
will go to the trouble of litigation).
,
73 See LINDER, MIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 31, at 236.
'74Public support of farmworker reform is crucial. As part of its attempts in 1996 to
organize strawberry workers in California, the UFW created "an East Coast media blitz" to
raise public awareness, and celebrities like Danny Glover and Edward James Olmos lent
support to the "National Strawberry Commission for Workers' Rights" at the AFL-CIO's
Washington office. See Ferriss & Raine, supra note 165, at B-1.




people's own families who at one time were also immigrants, 1 76 there should be
greater support for helping immigrants as they seek to establish themselves in the
United States.
Raising public awareness and support for the plight of migrant workers was
one of the goals of Mexican President Vincente Fox during his visit to the United
States in September of 2001.177 Fox insisted that the two governments agree by
the end of 2001 to grant legal status to Mexican citizens working illegally in the
United States.178 Although the possibility of an immigration agreement had been
discussed by the Bush and Fox administrations prior to Fox's speech,179 the Bush
administration has maintained that the issue of migrant workers in the United
States is a complex one that will take time to implement. 80 One of those
complexities is that relaxing immigration regulations for Mexicans will
undoubtedly draw opposition, and anger, from other groups of immigrants.' 8 '
176See Hamill, supra note 131, at 56. In his article, Hamill compares the experience of
Mexicans attempting to enter the United States to the experience of his parents who emigrated
from Northern Ireland in the 1920s. He writes that his parents "were driven by the same desires
as all these young migrants [from Mexico]-to work at a decent wage, to live with dignity, to
be sure that their children would be educated." Stating that more than four hundred "men and
women died trying to cross [the] border in the year 2000 alone," Hamill asserts that U.S. and
Mexican leaders "must insist on removing fear from the passage to the U.S." Most
significantly, Hamill stresses "[tihose of us who are children of the European migration can
play an important role in this process, pressuring American politicians to become instruments of
welcome, not rejection. That means we must see the new arrivals for what they are, links to our
own biographies." Id
177 See Ginger Thompson, Mexican President Urges U.S. to Act Soon on Migrants, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2001, at Al. In his speech, Fox contended that "immigrants have fueled
economic growth" and that the United States should 'build new conditions of fairness' for
undocumented Mexican immigrants 'whose hard work is a daily contribution to the prosperity
of [the United States]." Id.; see also Don Gonyea, President Vincente Fox's Visit to the White
House (NPR All Things Considered radio broadcast, Sept. 5, 2001) ("Fox has made it a goal of
his to negotiate some sort of legal status for [Mexicans currently living in the United States]."),
available at www.npr.org/ramfiles/atc200lO9O5.atc.ram.
178Thompson, supra note 177.
179Gonyea, supra note 177 (noting that during the past year, representatives of the two
governments have met repeatedly to discuss migration issues).
1801d. Attorney General John Ashcroft has participated in meetings on a migration
agreement with Mexican govemment representatives. Id. Although Ashcroft assured
interviewers after Fox's speech that the matter is a priority, he gave no indication of when an
agreement will be reached. Id.
131 See Thompson, supra note 177; see also Weiner, supra note 145. Many people
attempting to enter the United States "see Mexico's border as the most open path to the United
States." Id. In the last ten years, intemational smugglers "increasingly used Mexico as the next-
to-last stop in round-the-world routes to the United States." Id. The Mexican government has
been cooperating with United States officials to break up these international smuggling systems,




Considering the difficulty of creating sufficient public support and reforming
legislation, immigrant farmworkers may be best served by asserting their rights
collectively, as immigrant workers in other industries have done.!8 2 By seizing
upon the interest of unions,'8 3 such as UFW, in recruiting immigrant
farmworkers, these workers will have greater power when bargaining with
agricultural employers. 8 4  Even if farmworkers independently organize
themselves and work together to assert their rights as employees, large
agricultural businesses would not be able to take advantage of the immigrant
workers as easily as the businesses do now.'
Increasingly, unions have been focusing their recruiting efforts upon the
service industries.186 With immigrants comprising a significant portion of the
service sector, they are likely recruits for unions seeking to increase membership
numbers.'8 7 Recruitment efforts have been particularly strong in the agricultural
industry. The AFL-CIO has supported the UFW's "ongoing campaign" to
convince strawberry workers to become union members.' The union has also
negotiated contracts on behalf of workers raising vegetables, wine grapes, and
roses.8 9 The UFW's interest in immigrant agricultural workers reflects the
increasing desire unions in general have to include immigrants among union
ranks,190
'
82See Roosevelt, supra note 133, at 68 (describing recent victories achieved by illegal
immigrants under labor and civil rights laws). In Manhattan, four hundred immigrants working
for a delivery company joined a labor union and won three million dollars in back pay from
their employer. Id. The Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union posted bonds for
undocumented workers who were turned over to the INS by their employer after voting to join
the union. Id. at 69-70.
' See Ferriss & Raine, supra note 165; Roosevelt, supra note 133, at 68.
'14 See Ferriss & Raine, supra note 165; Roosevelt, supra note 133, at 68-70.
..
5 See WELLS, STRAWBERRY FIELDs, supra note 22, at 110 (discussing community-based
organization of Japanese sharecroppers); see also Gordon, supra note 39, at 428--37 (describing
the Workplace Project on Long Island and its efforts to help immigrant workers enlist the aid of
co-workers, so they can confront employers collectively when addressing a particular
grievance).
'
8 6 See Roosevelt, supra note 133, at 68. This focus upon service industries is a "practical"
way for the unions to bolster their memberships, which have suffered losses from decreases in
unionized manufacturing. Id.
187 Id.
"'Id. ("The AFL-CIO... has poured resources into organizing efforts heavily focused on
immigrants."). The UFW, "[flueled by AFL-CIO money and an unusually high level of support
from AFL-CIO President John Sweeney' began campaigning among strawberry workers in
1996, distributing "slick booklets decrying workers' wages and examples of abysmal living
conditions." Id.
'
89Ferriss & Raine, supra note 165, at B-I. In the mid-1990s, UFW "won thirteen
elections and negotiated eleven contracts" for various agricultural workers. Id.
'
90See supra notes 165-66. See generally Roosevelt, supra note 133, at 68.
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C0L TIVA TING FARMWORKER INJUSTICE
Though joining the union would benefit immigrant farmworkers, there are,
however, obstacles to many farmworkers becoming union members. Historically,
unions and immigrants have not gotten along well. 91 When unions have
organized immigrant-dominated industries, the unions' goals have been to
negotiate better contracts for workers, rather than work to improve conditions or
to "achieve social justice."'192 The strained relationship between unions and
immigrants is reflected by the disbelief of some workers that a union will help
them.
93
Another significant obstacle to unionization involves overcoming workers'
fears that employers will retaliate against individuals who support union
membership. These fears are not unfounded. In August of 1995, almost ninety
percent of the workers at VCNM Farms, which grows strawberries in Salinas,
California, voted in support of UFW representation.194 The following week,
VCNM destroyed a quarter of its crop; a month later, VCNM fired all of its
workers. 195 As a result of the employer's action, the union did not hold elections
the following year.19 6 Undoubtedly, it would be difficult to convince workers,
who rely financially upon growers, to support a union if the workers would risk
losing theirjobs.' 97
Employers, however, have been held accountable for their retaliatory actions.
The California Agricultural Labor Relations Board fined VCNM Farms for
destroying its produce after workers voted for the union. 19 Recently, a meat
industry employer was found to have violated labor laws for intimidating workers
who wanted to vote in the United Food and Commercial Workers' Union
elections.'9 9 These findings of employer liability for intimidating immigrant
'
9 1 See Gordon, supra note 39, at 423.
'
92/'d at 426.
9 See Ferriss & Raine, supra note 165, at B-1. Many strawberry farmworkers opposed the
UFW's recruitment efforts, alleging that the union's activities were "damaging the image of the
$600-million-dollar-a-year industry on which [the workers] depend." Id. Other workers were
frustrated by the union's inability to guarantee workers' jobs. Id.
194 d. Four hundred strawberry workers participated in the election. Id. Their demands
included implementing a seniority system, providing medical benefits, and stopping sexual
harassment of female workers. Id
195 MId.
196 Id. One union spokesperson acknowledged that "having an election and not
guaranteeing those workers would become partners in the industry" would be "irresponsible."
Id.
19 7 See Roosevelt, supra note 133, at 68. Despite maintaining its presence among
strawberry workers in California for five years, the UFW has enrolled less than one thousand of
the estimated twenty thousand workers. Id.
'
98Ferriss & Raine, supra note 165, at B-I. The $113,000 fine the company paid may
serve as a deterrent against future destruction of crops, but this fine did little to assist the
workers who lost theirjobs. Id.
'
99 See Smithfield Packing Co., Tar Heel Div., No-I 1-CA-15522, 2000 NLRB Lexis 905
(Dec. 15, 2000); see also Roosevelt, supra note 133, at 68. Smithfield Packing Co. is a pork-
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workers hopefully will be an incentive to workers to support unions, because
workers may have greater assurance that employers will not retaliate against
union members.
As an alternative to joining a union, other immigrant workers have succeeded
in improving working conditions by involving fellow workers in their complaints
against employers.200 This approach would require some outside assistance, most
likely through legal aid organizations such as California Rural Legal
Assistance.20 ' Already, one legal aid office has succeeded in helping immigrants
with labor issues by involving other workers when the immigrants confront
employers with grievances.
20 2
At the Workplace Project on Long Island,20 3 legal aid attorneys counsel
immigrant workers in assorted service industries to enlist the aid of other workers
when bringing grievances to an employer's attention.204 Bringing complaints as a
group to an employer strengthens the employees' position and also is a benefit if
the workers choose to bring a lawsuit against the employer.
205
These organized groups of workers function like informal unions.20 6 By
encouraging workers in specific fields to work together 07 and informing workers
of their rights through community outreach programs,20 ' the Workplace Project
hopes to make workers less dependent upon legal services, which are not always
accessible, and to increase workers' reliance upon their own skills when dealing
processing plant in North Carolina. Id. During a union drive in 1997, the company fired labor
activists, had police officers stationed in its parking lot on election day, and told workers that
the union would turn them into the INS. Id.2(0 Gordon, supra note 39, at 428-37.
201 See supra note 4 (discussing the work California Rural Legal Assistance does on behalf
of sharecroppers).202 See generally Gordon, supra note 39, at 428-37 (describing the Workplace Project on
Long Island and its efforts to address problems faced by immigrant workers and to help them
enlist the aid of other workers).203See id. at 428. The Workplace Project is one of an increasing number of "vorkers
centers [sic]" or "community-based membership organizations that organize workers to fight
widespread labor exploitation." Id.
204Id. at 443 (advocating a group effort by as many employees as possible to address an
employment problem in order for the action to be most effective).205 Id. at 440 ("[L]awsuits that are not backed by a strong group of workers often flounder
because they are vulnerable to the pitfalls of the legal process.").216 Id. at 429 ('"hese centers are part of an effort to build a new labor movement, to lead
the fight against exploitation of immigrants and other working-class people.").2071d. at430-33.
201,d. at 433-37. Education efforts include distributing information in Spanish about




with employers' exploitative policies. °9 Some workers have succeeded in
receiving past due wages and have attracted positive community attention when
they confronted an employer as a group but without any legal representation.
210
Similar informal, community-based organizations have already been used by
sharecroppers with some success. Japanese farmers who sharecropped
strawberries in California were assisted by their "group solidarity and
organization. 212 In addition, Japanese organizations helped farmworkers "in their
[workers'] relations with landowners, helping them find land, setting maximum
rent levels and minimum wage levels that Japanese should accept, and mediating
disputes between them and the landlords.21 3 By uniting as a community,
immigrant fannworkers will be able to negotiate for more equitable terms when
entering into contracts with agricultural employers, similar to the way Japanese
sharecroppers once did. A farmworker will also be able to rely on community
support if a dispute arises with an employer.
Organizing group action by immigrant farmworkers will be challenging, but
these informal, community-based unions may be more effective for immigrant
farmworkers 4 Despite the obstacles, group action by immigrant farmworkers
when entering contracts to work as well as when bringing grievances to
agricultural employers, would significantly strengthen workers' positions.
215
209Id. at 438-39 ("[A] successful experience with legal services taught the worker nothing
more than reliance on legal services .... Once a problem has been defined as part of the legal
sphere, people are reluctant to take it back into their own hands.').210Id. at 432. Gordon recounts the experience of a landscape worker, Miguel Alejandro
Guevara, whose employer had not paid him for nine days of work. Id. The employer claimed
that because the owner of the home where Guevara did the landscaping had not paid his bill,
Guevara would not be compensated. Id. Accompanied by sixteen other landscapers, Guevara
confronted the employer in front of one his customers. Id. The employer eventually promised to
pay Guevara his wages, and the customer threatened to withhold payment from the employer if
he did not keep his promise. Id.2 1 1 WES,. STRAWBERRY FIELDS, supra note 22, at 110. Wells cautions that the success of




214See Gordon, supra note 39, at 422 n.53 (citing various law review articles that note the
lack of legal resources available to immigrant workers). Although farmworkers would need
some initial support from a legal aid group, following the model established by the Workplace
Project would enable workers to assume leadership roles in organizational efforts. Thus, as
farmworkers grew more adept at representing themselves and recruiting other workers facing
similar dilemmas, the workers would become less dependent upon limited legal resources. See
2 15 See id at 443.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Although organizing, either through established unions or community-based
groups, poses many challenges for immigrant farmworkers, it may be the best
course of action. Lacking more comprehensive protective legislation and
consistent enforcement of existing law by the courts, immigrant farmworkers
have to assume an active role in guaranteeing that they are treated fairly by
agricultural employers. Ironically, it is only by achieving a level of independence,
either by accepting the help of established unions or following the example of
immigrant workers in other industries, that immigrant farmworkers will be able to
protect themselves as employees.
